

*Union* *HK* *LM*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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November 3, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Intelligence Support in the  
October 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict

In your memorandum of October 23 you recommended that a study of the timeliness and adequacy of the intelligence support rendered during the October Arab-Israeli conflict be undertaken by the NSC Intelligence Committee Working Group. On the same date, the Director of Central Intelligence reported he was initiating such a study for consideration by the U. S. Intelligence Board. The completed study will be submitted to the NSC Intelligence Committee for further review.

*Henry A. Kissinger*  
Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence

OSD, NSS Reviews  
Completed.

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MEMORANDUM

5888

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/NOFORN

ACTION  
October 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: A. W. Marshall *AWM*

SUBJECT: NSCIC Evaluation of Intelligence Support in the  
Current Arab-Israeli Conflict

Clements has recommended to you as Chairman of the NSCIC that the NSCIC Working Group undertake an evaluation of intelligence support during the current Mid-East crisis (see Tab B).

Several reviews have already been started which will meet both Clements' and the NSCIC's needs.

-- Colby instituted a major review throughout the intelligence community. He has tasked the USIB Principals for support (see Tab C). I have talked with his staff, and he will submit the study to the NSCIC. Clements' staff now is aware of this effort.

-- I am conducting an evaluation of the intelligence support from the perspective of the NSC staff. My views, which will be sent to you later, will serve as your independent check on Colby's product.

-- Informal studies have been conducted by several military services and elements of DIA. These will contribute to Colby's work.

Colby's study is acknowledged by Clements' people as meeting the requirements which Clements had in mind in sending to you the request for the NSCIC to act. Colby is conducting the study in both his roles as DCI and Deputy Chairman of the NSCIC.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to <sup>*Clements*</sup> ~~the NSCIC~~ noting that the DCI is undertaking a review on behalf of the NSCIC. I will inform Clements' people that this responds to his request.

SECRET/NOFORN - GDS



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

NSC 5888

23 OCT 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Intelligence Support in the Current Arab-Israeli  
Conflict (U)

(SNF) I believe that it would be useful to have the NSCIC Working Group undertake a study of the timeliness and adequacy of the intelligence support rendered on the current Arab-Israeli conflict both before and during the hostilities. In particular, I think such a study could well address the following points:

- The adequacy of regional collection coverage prior to and during hostilities in providing an accurate <sup>timely</sup> depiction of the situation and the military capabilities of the combatants, as well as recommendation for any indicated adjustments in our collection capability and posture in the area.

- The adequacy of the interpretation of the available intelligence both before and during hostilities, in particular, the adequacy of our interpretative effort in providing a forecast of a probable attack by the Arabs as well as an estimate of relative military capabilities.

- The influence of Israeli inputs and judgments on our own intelligence appraisals.

- Whether any of the arrangements for improved support recommended in the recent Working Group report on crisis intelligence support were put into effect, and how well these worked.

(C) As I stated in my earlier memorandum of <sup>June 15</sup> 23 May on crisis intelligence support, I think it important that records be kept of the intelligence actions taken during a crisis situation, so that we can later

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CLASSIFIED ON: 31 Dec 81  
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reconstruct accurately how well our intelligence machinery functioned. For this reason, and also to enable assessment while memories are still fresh, I suggest that the Working Group take up the study immediately.

A.P. Clement

Copy to:

DCI

Chairman, JCS

Deputy Secretary of State

Attorney General

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

15 JUNE 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Studies of Intelligence Crisis Support

(U) By memorandum of 23 May your staff requested comment on the report of conclusions and recommendations of the Working Group of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, drawn from the three post-mortem studies which the Group has completed so far on intelligence support during crisis situations.

(S) I have reviewed these conclusions and recommendations and am in general agreement with their substance. With regard to the need for better two-way communication between policy-makers and intelligence producers, my policy staff makes the point that in their recollection this communication did function during each of these crises at a better level of effectiveness than the Working Group report would lead one to believe. However, the measures proposed for a more positive set of formal arrangements for liaison and for monitoring the flow of intelligence support seem sound and useful.

(U) I have the following points to suggest as modifications and additions to these arrangements.

(S) First, I note that the Working Group report recommends (paragraph 13, pages 4-5) that the DCI appoint a senior representative for crisis liaison and monitoring of support to the NSC machinery, and that this individual should, as his primary qualification, have "a broad understanding of the region in which the crisis is centered" (underscoring mine). It seems to me that this focus on regional expertise misses the point. In the first place, the DCI's man should be sufficiently senior to speak for the DCI and have access to the same official levels, if need be, as the DCI himself does. This face-to-face contact is the most effective means of solving the fundamental problem of communication

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between high-level users and producers. To insure this personal contact, a level of seniority above that normally occupied by a regional expert is called for. Second, those crises in which the U.S. is involved take on their primary importance in terms of the potential confrontation between ourselves and other major powers. The region provides the setting, but the local issues are transcended by those of the great power relationships involved.

(S) Elsewhere (page 3), the Working Group report speaks precisely to this point when it notes that intelligence analysts (who are regional specialists) have lacked a sufficiently broad perspective on the crisis, especially on Soviet and CPR roles and intentions, and have failed to share the broader concerns of the policy staffs whom they support. I would suggest, therefore, that sufficient seniority to act as alter ego for the DCI and a broad knowledge of current national security issues be substituted for regional expertise as the primary qualifications for the DCI's senior crisis liaison and support monitoring officials.

(S) With regard to post mortem studies of future crisis situations, I suggest that these be prepared for by adopting procedures in advance of future crises which will enable better reconstruction of what actually happened than can be obtained from the memories of participants and normal administrative records. Purposeful, albeit informal, records of intelligence actions should be compiled at the time they happen, if we are later to measure accurately how well intelligence responded, and what improvements are needed.

(U) I also suggest that future studies take up some of the crisis intelligence support which did not surface in the examples studied so far. Specifically, the problems of simultaneous crises in different areas and of communications with policy staff echelons below the NSC machinery and those outside of Washington might well be addressed.

(S) As a last point, I believe that a more positive approach should be taken to study and decide on problems of third party support than is contained in the report. Since our reliance on such support during a future crisis is already evident, we should study each such situation now, and make definite policy decision on quid pro quo, security policies, confidence

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levels expected, and other key aspects. This reduces the need for ad hoc decisions to be made hastily as a crisis impends or proceeds.

(U) I suggest that the NSCIC include the above points in their guidance on the report to the DCI.

Signed  
W. P. CLEMENTS JR.

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23 OCT 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT: Post Mortem on Arab-Israeli Conflict

1. I have asked [redacted] the Intelligence Community Staff to review the intelligence community activities pertaining to the current conflict in the Middle East. This study will review our actions before the outbreak of hostilities and the intelligence support provided to national consumers during the crisis.

2. I request that you provide assistance to the Intelligence Community Staff in their effort. Specifically, I have in mind the after-action reports that you are undoubtedly preparing for your own organizations; these reports will be very helpful. Additionally, I ask that working level analysts and managers be available for interviews as the pressure of the crisis slackens. The final report will be considered as a USIB agenda item at an appropriate time in the next month or so.

15/  
W. E. Colby  
Chairman

DCI/IC/PRG

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1-DDCI  
1-D/DCI/IC Chron  
1-Subject

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT:

Evaluation of Intelligence Support in the Current  
Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Director of Central Intelligence, acting in his capacity as Deputy Chairman of the NSCIC, is conducting an evaluation of intelligence support to the policymakers during the Arab-Israeli conflict of October, 1973. This study will be reviewed by the NSCIC for the formulation of guidance to the intelligence community as to the needs of policymakers in future periods of international tension.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Intelligence Support in the  
October 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict

I <sup>on the same date</sup> ~~have received~~ your memorandum of October 23 ~~in which~~ you recommended that a study of the timeliness and adequacy of the intelligence support rendered during the October Arab-Israeli conflict be undertaken by the NSC Intelligence Committee Working Group. ~~In a memorandum of October 23, the Director of Central Intelligence indicated he was initiating such a study for consideration by the U.S. Intelligence Board. I have been advised that the completed study will be provided to members of the NSC Intelligence Committee.~~ <sup>submitted to</sup> ~~and then~~ for further review.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence

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